You've just stated what you think to be a philosophical fact.  But then you say not to use such facts.  You have violated sntjohnny's golden rule of epistemology.  Well done.  I wasn't soliciting examples, but well done.

Yea, but he wasn't speaking in this context.

If he was, then he would be in violation of this rule, and plain common sense.

After all, you need reason to say that reason is the devil's whore, and if 'reason is the devil's whore' is a statement derived from reason it is apparently a satanic conclusion and thus we could not trust it.

Primarily the notion that we can be saved or 'find God' based on reason alone.

If you think otherwise, you could provide a fuller passage.

If I'm corrected, and my recollection is wrong, and that's not what he meant, and he really meant reason in general, he is a fool idiot and we should pay no attention to him.

"Give one example of where this is true. Personally, I know of no skeptic who believes that historical knowledge,"

How about we'll just give one example, and we'll draw it just from your own post:

"To then ignore the vast bulk of human experience -- which is what we do when, on the basis of the testimony of a few people, we believe that an extraordinary event occurred"

This is clearly a repudiation of historical knowledge.  Anyone can see that for virtually every alleged piece of history, we have only the testimony of a few, and since each moment of time is not repeatable, a singularity if you will, it is proper to view every single moment and event as an extraordinary event.  The only way that you could detect a miracle is against the backdrop of regularity, and the only way you could know that something was 'regular' or 'irregular' is by examining human testimony through the ages.  But you reject out of hand the testimony about the incidents that suit your fancy, and put your 'faith' only in that which you think can be verified by the scientific method, thus illustrating my assertion, in the very post you deny it in. 

 "The difference lies almost entirely in the value that the two place on faith or nonevidential belief."

That is just false.

"Generally, theists believe that faith can result in a form of knowledge (although no theist can demonstrate this) and skeptics do not."

It is not demonstrable only if you use the skeptic's moldy and pathetic caricature understanding of what Christians mean by 'faith,' illustrated by comments like Dawkins's view that we think faith is believing in spite of the evidence.  It is demonstrable when you take the more robust understanding, that posits faith as being relational, speaking in particular to trust.  Trusting a method, for example, the scientific method, is to put faith in it.  Skeptics trust the scientific method, don't they?  For good reason, you'd say.  We trust God.  For good reason, we'd say- Jesus rose from the dead, as promised, so he's likely to be trustworthy in other things.  Being willing to trust is not something I would categorize as a 'form of knowledge' as you phrase it, but it is certainly an appropriate path to some knowledge.

For example, you cannot possibly know what it is like to sit on a chair unless you sit in it, and sitting in it requires a certain amount of faith that it isn't going to *poof* out of existence, or summarily collapse, though both are possible.  So, it is certainly true that there are aspects of the Christian walk that could be best understood, experientially, only after you've stepped out in trust.  But this is no irrational then pointing out that actually doing something is different then understanding it in the abstract, and it certainly is hardly different then how we generally conduct ourselves in every other area of our life, either.

For example, a basic epistemological difference between educated Christians and educated skeptics is that a Christian is willing to gather information across a variety of different categories of knowledge- historical, philosophical, scientific, etc, while the skeptic thinks 'science' is the way to go and supercedes them all.  That's a generalization, but true for most of my experiences.

That's not a generalisation, that is a strawman.

What you don't like is when we have a different point of view about the importance of your perspective on logic, philosophy etc.

If physical evidence is there and that physical evidence contradicts philosophy, which takes precedence?

The physical evidence does.  That is what we are talking about. 

"That's not a generalisation, that is a strawman."

That's a really silly thing to say, Phil.  I said it was my experience, and without you knowing the particulars of my experience, you have absolutely no evidence by which to determine if I have characterized my experience correctly.

For example, it may be a strawman as it applies to you, but then up until this post, this is the first time you and I have interacted that I am aware of.

I think it is pretty ironic that you have inserted a philosophical objection (labeling something a strawman is labeling it a logical fallacy) while attempting to raise up empirical realities as supreme.  Well, my empirical experience was just as I described, and on your own standard it would be foolish for me to dispense with those observations. 

You shot argument in the foot, my friend.