As we learn more about the mind / brain, if we find out that the mind does NOT reduce to matter, than metaphysical naturalism will be falsified.

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Within Christian theism, God is primary and fundamental whereas nature is secondary and derivative. Naturalism, by contrast, asserts that nature is primary and fundamental.

OK.  What gets one to conclude this ?

Ah, now we've really made progress.  If there is nothing to suggest a God in the first place, how is it that we're debating his existence or lack thereof?  This conversation has taken a productive turn.

What was your "tipping point" into activism?

A combination of 9/11 and the Bush era mixing of religion and government. Especially evolution denial and gay marriage.

Really, it was kind of like 'You have abused your privilege of not being challenged about having an invisible friend who can do magic. Grow up.'

Are you asking me to justify this from within the Christian world view?

Or are you objecting to his assertion that for the naturalist nature is primary and fundamental?

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What was your "tipping point" into activism?

A combination of 9/11 and the Bush era mixing of religion and government. Especially evolution denial and gay marriage.

Really, it was kind of like 'You have abused your privilege of not being challenged about having an invisible friend who can do magic. Grow up.'

It makes perfect sense.  And your failure to understand the matter is proof positive that you're operating on a caricature.  What you need is a model to understand the nature of the relationship.

Since by the Christian definition of God there is no non-God stuff, this comment is fundamentally meaningless.

Go back to the Dembski article and the section on Logos.  It will dawn on you in
due time.  You were closest when reacting to the Catholic entry when you muttered that it was 'fiction.'

You read any CS Lewis?  If so, I can point you in a couple of places with him, too. 

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There is no reason why our predictions must be confirmed in currently 'unknown' scriptures.

It's inherent in the meaning of the word prediction.

It is not inherent that it must be in 'unknown' Scriptures.  The predictions can be confirmed by looking at existing Scriptures, too.

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Right, you're equivocating.  Because in the wiki article empiricism was contrasted with supernaturalism""

"Yes.  Empirical methods have consistently discovered a certain set of things"

You seem to have forgotten what your challenge was.  You said in MN, empiricism was merely being lined up against rationalism.  I said no, it was being lined up against supernaturalism, you said where.  I showed where.

"Produce a supernatural explanation.  Usually, the supernatural explanation leaves so many unknowns as to be worthless.  If you want to posit a God who created life via [mechanism X], then give evidence of the God and / or the method."

But you have already heard the evidence and the method.  Back to Dembski, please.  The Logos section.

"A supernatural explanation is not a default, nor is a natural one.  The default explanation is [shrug.]"

That is false.  Did you already forget that you said: "Methodological naturalism would force all explanations to be in the form of natural phenomena, yes."

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That was the question, please speak to it.  Do you have an objective criteria for how long a reasonable person should wait for all naturalistic explanations to be ruled out?

"There shouldn't be any waiting."

This is in contradiction to your statement here:  "And when the explanations led to no progress in finding more and more accurate natural explanations, and the spirit goo maintained its ability to accomplish mental processes independent of component arrangement, then a supernatural explanation for this new class of [stuff] would be preferred."

Clearly in this statement there is waiting- waiting to see if natural explanations emerge or not.

"For two competing models, you have to find where they predict different things.  If humans are intelligent animals they would also continue to do terrible things."

Interesting.  I've never heard it alleged that intelligence leads inexorably to doing terrible things.   So, it doesn't bother you that Christians during the inquisition tortured Jews?  Your world view predicts just as much, so you aren't surprised by it.  And if both predict it, then such atrocities can't be used at the same time as an argument against either, right?

"The first thing I offered was to accept your definition of Christianity and you told me not to, and now you're criticizing me for it.  Make up your $@#%@$#% mind.  Should I accept others' definitions or use my own."

You did no such thing.  When I told you the definition you quibbled with me over whether or not it was appropriate for me to say that 'this was the definition.'  Then you bailed out saying that you didn't care, anyway.

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If you're starting to get pissed off, join the club.

Please show me where I refused to use your definition for the purposes of communication.

"How in the world would I know what Dawkins would prefer ?"

Yea, he's a real tough read, isn't he?   

"Definitely not.  An immaterial mind would not mean there was a God, it would just mean metaphysical naturalism would be falsified."

That's what I meant.  I would not consider metaphysical naturalism to be falsified.

"Did you read any of the essay ?"

No, I didn't, because at this time I'm not interested in arguing the merits of one view or another in regards to the mind.  This came up because you thought it was a falsification of metaphysical naturalism.  It isn't.  There are non-reductionist metaphysical naturalists.

"I may check out the podcast depending on time."

I do suggest it.  She points out that Dennet didn't even seem to object to it.

"It doesn't explain anything in any specific way."

Oh, so now we value specificity, predictability, etc?

For a metaphysical naturalist, there are an awful lot of universals you are counting on?    Why should something more specific, more predictable, be better?

The supernaturalistic model works, I'd say that's enough.  :)

"In reality, either there are things that can do mental processes without being dependent on a complex arrangement of fundamentally mindless particles blindly following laws, or there aren't.  If there are, metaphysical naturalism is false.  If there aren't then it is true.  Christian theism fits under one of those cases."

No.  You are speaking within the system.  Re-phrase:  Within our reality as detected by our senses, there are things that can do mental processes [snip] or there aren't."

But Christian theism does not speak to a reality within our reality as detected by our senses, does it?  That's the point.

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You have yet to reflect accurately the Christian world view here.  Your notion of the 'supernatural' is not as Christians have understood it for centuries.

Of course not.  I've only found two coherent natural / supernatural distinctions, and very few Christians take them that way.  Most use the word in such a way that it has no real meaning.

This would be funny if it weren't so sad.  You admit that your notion is not as Christians have understood it.  In your view, their understanding isn't coherent anyway.  Nonetheless, you think your view is a genuine alternative to Christianity.  Crazy.

"Every time a Christian tries to explain it to me, they end up with nonsense." 

You'll pardon me if I don't read the link.  If you had something particular in mind, that'd be different.  However, the fact that you can never seem to understand the Christians does not necessarily mean that they are muttering 'nonsense.'  There is another possibility- there is something within your outlook that stands in the way of understanding them.  Think about it.

"Every time a Christian tries to explain it to me, they end up with nonsense." 

"Is that how this is going to work ?  I read your links all the way through and you skim or ignore mine ?  Should I stop investing the effort of following you links, reading some of the books Christians recommend to me ?"

"Relationship between what and what ?  God and God ?  You just said there wasn't anything that wasn't God !!!!!"

You're getting there.

"Reading...nothing helpful.  I muttered that a fictional character that was claimed to be immanent would be indistinguishable, IIRC...yeah, 'immanence and fictional status seem to be indistinguishable.'"

Does 'fictional' necessarily mean unreal?

Is it possible to even know something that is unreal in its entirety?

Shouldn't even 'fictional status' be real in some sense or else we couldn't know about it?

"Predictions, by definition, deal with future observations."

Nah.  But you didn't say anything about my Dead Sea Scrolls example.  Even though I disagree with you, I gave you what you wanted.  Aren't you pleased?

"There is no evidence nor method in Dembski's section.  It's just a bunch of assertions."

There is definitely a method.  The evidence is not all explicit, but I can help with that.  I'm waiting for you to identify the method.  Its not a trick question.  He actually says it.

"Yes.  It's simple.  The default explanation for any phenomena has to be [shrug.]"

If you left it at t hat, I'd be with you.  But you don't.  You go on to support your position by not having a [shrug] method, but one with a decided bias:  "methodological naturalism requires all proposed explanations to be in the form of natural phenomena."

You can't with coherency argue that you have a [shrug] attitude while employing a [all proposed explanations to be in the form of natural phenomena] method.

Excellent.  In that case, then, I won't be hearing from you that Christianity is falsified because of all the evil Christians do.

"The emphasis was more on animal than intelligent."

Thanks for the clarification.  Although, one couldn't know something was 'terrible' without the intelligence, could they?

""I ask the opposite: that you accept my understanding of metaphysical naturalism / natural / supernatural in this discussion.""
"That is not a refusal to use your conception."

Of course it is.  lol.

"Would you consider the conception of metaphysical naturalism I am presenting to be falsified ?"

If I understand your question, No, because as I've already stated, you're trying to use it both as an implication of the world view and as evidence for the world view.  But as an implication, it only works as falsification if you have independent reasons for accepting the world view apart from the mind/body issue.  So you have to pick one approach.  If you pick 'as evidence' then it would make strides towards being falsifiable.  If you pick 'as implication' it is not a possible criterion to use as falsification, as the position is derived, not demonstrated.

"You'd have to show me how they define the natural - supernatural distinction, then."

That's just the point.  They're atheists.  They don't believe in the supernatural, they don't think there is a supernatural, but they still don't take the reductionist line.

"Obviously, the model that is more specific and whose predictions better match reality would be more accurate."

But that is universalist language, and the wiki makes it clear that universals are incompatible with MN:

"Metaphysical naturalism is any worldview in which the world is amenable to a unified study that includes the natural sciences and in this sense the world is a unity. According to such a view, nature is all there is, and all things supernatural (which stipulatively includes spirits and souls, non-natural values, and universals as they are commonly conceived) do not exist."

That a more specific model with predictions that are verified is actually a better match for reality is an intuitive axiom.  There is no way to demonstrate it.  You are appealing to intuition.

Fantastic.  Progress.  Next question:  Just HOW would we detect realities that are not detected by our senses?  That is the question.

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"Every time a Christian tries to explain it to me, they end up with nonsense." 

"Is that how this is going to work ?  I read your links all the way through and you skim or ignore mine ?  Should I stop investing the effort of following you links, reading some of the books Christians recommend to me ?"

I have assured you that the links are relevant to the point that I was making.  This link was presented as an anecdote referring to previous experiences.  How is the fact that in your experience you have found attempts to be nonsense to be relevant to our conversation here?

It is true that I only skimmed the wiki article, but that is only because I have already read it before.  As you can see from the course of the conversation, I continue to utilize the wiki article.   Also, I did look at the link about whether or not abiogenesis would be impressive or not.  So, I am not guilty of your charge.  I'm just not going to read a long forum thread trying to identify which parts you consider to be 'nonsense' without some specific reason to do so.

Strictly speaking, it isn't unreal.  It just has a different level of reality, it is different qualia.  Let's take an example of something invented, namely, the multiverse.   The multiverse is well outside of our empirical reach, existing as a theory by physicists.  It was invented.  As a concept it did not exist until this last century and it existed only by virtue of scientists thinking about it.  It is a 'fiction,' is it not?  Granted, it is a fiction that some people believe is actual, but at this point there is no way to determine if it is or not.  As it stands, it is mere concept.  Does this make it unreal?

"It's really an idea or concept."

And ideas aren't real?

Thank you.  Hint, its the logos section.

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"The emphasis was more on animal than intelligent."

Thanks for the clarification.  Although, one couldn't know something was 'terrible' without the intelligence, could they?

True.

But 'terrible' would also be a moral assessment in some measure, wouldn't it?  Animals chew each other up all the time.  Why should it be 'terrible'?  Why not merely natural?

Possibly, but that's still far from the point.  You were advocating the position that showing that the mind did not 'reduct' to brain would falsify the position.  I disagreed in general for my own reasons, but pointed out that there are metaphysical naturalists who are not reductionists in terms of the mind, so clearly they don't think it falsifies the view.  In other words, you need another falsification criterion.

What all metaphysical naturalists agree on, however, is that the fundamental constituents of reality, from which everything derives and upon which everything depends, are fundamentally mindless. So if any variety of metaphysical naturalism is true, then any mental properties that exist (hence any mental powers or beings) are causally derived from, and ontologically dependent on, systems of nonmental properties, powers, or things. This means metaphysical naturalism would be false if any distinctly mental property, power, or entity exists that is not ontologically dependent on some arrangement of nonmental things, or that is not causally derived from some arrangement of nonmental things, or that has causal effects without the involvement of any arrangement of nonmental things that is already causally sufficient to produce that effect.

"Nonsense.  Team A can set up a simulated reality and Teams B, C, D, etc."

Not nonsense.  Reality.  There is no inherent property of matter that says that repeatability is a more valid test of reality than something ad hoc.  Sure, we depend on it, we count on it, etc.  But you are appealing not to a characteristic of nature, but rather an idea we have about nature.  However, at this point, you seem to be saying that ideas are unreal.  The only way that your argument holds is if there are non-empirical realities exist.  Better example- Occam's razor.  This is a good general principle, of course.  It pertains to explanatory accounts that are all coherent, but some accounts contain more axioms than others.   Since the accounts all 'work' you can't choose one over the other on coherency.  Occam says go with the one with the fewer 'epicycles.'  Sure, but it is only an internal mental intuition that says that this is reasonable.

But from your view, as explained in the wiki, such intuitions are not real.

"You can't.  It is impossible by definition.  We detect things via our senses, and therefore could not detect things that you can't detect via your senses."

It isn't impossible by definition.  You can't empirically, of course.  But why are you so insistent on restraining yourself to empiricalism?  Now, remember that I pointed out that I am not at all saying that there can be no interaction at all, and pointed out that what I am disputing is that there could be any kind of methodological empirical detection, but fully accept and predict that such 'detection' would still be mediated through the external world and perceived by our senses.

For example, Jesus walked on water.  This was seen by the disciples.  They touched him.  They heard him.  But if anyone could walk on the water and it happened on demand, both in the past and today, 'walking on water' would be indistinguishable from a normal law of nature.  You would find it no more startling to hear that someone walked on the water as you  are startled to hear that someone walked on the road.

That's right.  If it is real, it is real whether we have gained 'empirical' knowledge of it.  But since you acknowledge that in fact it may always be the case that we can't verify it, our knowledge of it, such that it is, would be only as a mental construct, a fiction.  That it is a fiction at this point does not mean that there is no correlation to reality outside our minds, but neither does it mean that a fiction is a null reality, either.

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"It's really an idea or concept."
And ideas aren't real?
Bah.  Ideas are really ideas, but all by themselves I wouldn't consider them real, no.

Well, you're espousing a curious point of view, then.  If Ideas aren't real, how is it that you can work with them?  They must be real in some sense.  My guess is you're thinking that ideas are only real contingently on us thinking about them.  Am I right?  If there were no minds, would there be no ideas?

"I see a proposed method of interaction between God and God (weird) of divine speech, but this method has not been demonstrated.  In any case, if that is what you meant, that is not what I meant by method.  There is no method given whereby one arrives at more and more accurate beliefs about the supernatural."

Well, clearly this is going to be a long haul.  You understood from the article that God creates by speaking?

Let us therefore turn to the creation of the world as treated in Scripture. The first thing that strikes us is the mode of creation. God speaks and things happen. There is something singularly appropriate about this mode of creation. Any act of creation is the concretization of an intention by an intelligent agent. Now in our experience, the concretization of an intention can occur in any number of ways. Sculptors concretize their intentions by chipping away at stone; musicians by writing notes on lined sheets of paper; engineers by drawing up blueprints; etc. But in the final analysis, all concretizations of intentions can be subsumed under language. For instance, a precise enough set of instructions in a natural language will tell the sculptor how to form the statue, the musician how to record the notes, and the engineer how to draw up the blueprints. In this way language becomes the universal medium for concretizing intentions.

Be that as it may, I am going to consider your notion that an irreducible mind would falsify metaphysical naturalism as off the table.  I have already given you an example of such a man who is a metaphysical naturalist who is also a non-reductionist, John Searle.  There doesn't have to be 'many' there only need to be a few with some good arguments.  Apparently there are.  I'm not going to debate this endlessly.  Move on to a different piece of falsification.  If you have one, that is.

"Of course.  They are abstract concepts - they don't have an independent existence of their own."

Ah, right.  They don't have an independent existence, therefore they aren't real?  But that must be over-reaching, as if something lacked any reality at all, there'd be no way at all to interact with it.  Think of trying to reach out with your hand and clutch the air.  It won't work.  Your hand can only grab what is 'real' 'enough' to grab.  If there is nothing, no amount of clutching will produce something.   The same principle is at work here with abstractions.  It isn't that they aren't real, its just that the nature of their reality is different, is a different sort, then say, our hands.

Independent existence... ie, our ideas exist contingently on our thinking.  Our thinking gives life to their existence, apart from our thinking, they do not exist, correct?  Unless we sustain the abstraction by our thinking, *poof* it is gone.  Agree?

"For example, Jesus walked on water.  This was seen by the disciples. ... "

"Of course.  Jesus walking on water would be an empirical observation, though, perceived through the senses."

It would be an empirical observation at the time, but how would you demonstrate that Jesus actually walked on the water, today?

"We could use different methods to attempt to arrive at an explanation for that empirical observation - methodological naturalism, etc."

But in the case of Jesus walking on the water, surely if you were observing that, you would conclude that walking on water is possible via natural laws, right?

No, you would probably want to see other people walking on the water, habitually, over time, etc.  Only after it seems as though everyone can do it would you think it is a natural law.  But then, Jesus' walking on the water is no longer a good reason to think there was something special, right?

This goes to:  "That is why I keep disputing that your version of the Christian God is invisible to empirical methods"

In other words, you continue to equivocate.  'Empirical methods' means consistent observation in all places at all times, but you are confounding that with the observation that Jesus walked across the water, an event that was perceived through the senses, and calling that 'empirical.'

If God were not to reveal himself through the medium of our senses (and so empirical in that sense) how do you propose he reveal himself?

And if he revealed himself over and over and over again, on demand, (and so empirical in yet another sense) how would that be different then perceiving a 'natural law'?

"A God who designed DNA or who walked on water is intervening in empirical reality - his actions are not invisible."

We still have not yet gotten to how exactly God designed the DNA, but understand that with the walking on water, the doctrine of the incarnation comes into play.  In Carnate.  Become flesh.  Jesus is not just another version of Zeus, where Jesus is located somewhere in the universe and we just haven't found him yet. 

"If there were no minds, there would be no ideas, yes."

Ok, is it an 'idea' that a triangle has only three sides?  If there were no minds, would there be no triangles?

"It's right there, straightforward and concise, under the section titled "The Creation of The World."  It would be tough to make it plainer."

Right.  So God creates by speaking things into existence.  Do we have any analogs to human creation that is similar to creation by speaking?

"I don't."

Really?  That's all you have?

How do you know that Searle doesn't understand it as you understand it?  Granted, I'm no Searle expert, but he seems to understand PN just fine, he just isn't a reductionist.   If I were you, since you are apparently putting so much weight on this as your falsification criteria, upon finding out that there is a fellow PNer of stature who is not a reductionist, I'd go out of my way to check into it.  Especially if that was my primary falsification criteria.

I'd feel a similar urge if I came across a Christian of repute who didn't think that finding Jesus' dead body falsified Christianity.  Btw, good luck finding one.

"Sure.  Actually, there is a guy over at iidb who apparently has run into this too many times and who now calls himself an ideatheist.  Instead of saying he doesn't think God is real, he says God is only an idea."

An idea, a fiction.  But in a sense real.  He should call himself an ideagnostic, with God being in the same category as the multiverse.  Something that may or may not be and we may or may not ever know.

Still, back to the point.  It isn't merely 'proving a negative.'  What we want to do is explore the contingent nature of these ideas as they relate to the ones thinking about them.

"Talking about the 'existence' of ideas makes my head hurt.  But, roughly, I think I agree with what you are saying."

I think you're doing fine.  Let's keep on it.  If someone thinking of an idea is what gives the idea its reality, we say it is contingent.  However, under your reductionist view, all mental states eventually reduce somehow to some physical state.  Shouldn't you actually be saying that ideas are as real as we are, being composed of matter, represented in the physical mental state that manifests the idea?

That seems to me a logical extension of your view as I understand it, but I would like to also suggest that this in itself, even if true, wouldn't avoid the question I'm probing.

Namely, it might be that there are triangles without minds to comprehend them because there are three sided things whether we have a concept for them or not, and it might be that the idea of a triangle reduces to some physical state and in its own way is not 'real,' but somewhere there must exist a place to judge that a three sided figure and a four sided figure cannot both be called a triangle.

If this logical fact reduces merely to a physical state just as the concept of 'triangle' does, then we can in turn reduce that 'logical fact' to a mere physical state, and nothing more.

In other words, it may be that the concept of 'triangle' is contingent on a mind, and it may be that this concept is nothing more than matter, but if the judgment that a four sided figure cannot be called a triangle is also contingent, then it can truly be said that when someone is not thinking about it, it is not in fact true.  As a reality, it does not exist.  It exists only insofar as someone is considering it.

Or... we can agree that this judgment itself is non-contingent.  It exists and is real and true whether we think it or not.  And that begs the question of where this 'judgment' resides, if not merely as a product of the mind.

"You couldn't.  Similarly, you could not demonstrate that 50,000 revolutions ago gravity kept the moon in the same orbit we think it did."

Well, you couldn't using 'empirical' in the sense of methodology, at least.  Set aside walking on water, or the past orbit of the moon.  What if the claim was "Washington cut down the cherry tree"?  Can this be empirically verified or refuted?  If not, does that mean that we are helpless?

If everyone can walk on a road, you would think that no one was particularly special just because they could walk on the road.  If a person said "Hey, I'm God, look at me, I can walk on a road" you wouldn't believe him, right, because who can walk on roads?  heh oh, wait a minute.  Everyone can walk on roads!  You wouldn't believe him even though he walked on a road because it is in fact something that anyone can do!  Similarly, if it were the case that everyone could walk on the water, a person who claimed to be 'special' who walked on the water would be dismissed.  It is only because walking on the water is impossible for the rest of us that it is capable of being a convincing demonstration for someone claiming to be 'something special.'

In other words, the empirical methodology that you're hanging your hat on is actually something that Christians readily endorse, because it is helpful to know that people don't walk on water, bread doesn't multiply out of nothing, and people don't typically rise from the dead in order to establish the credentials of an entity that claims they are 'something special.'

"If Jesus really had an ability to walk on water at will, I fail to see why that interaction cannot be phrased as a law."

If only Jesus had this ability, I think you'd find it quite difficult to phrase it as a law.  Most people understand a natural law to be the repeated confirmations of similar observations, etc.

A 'law' is merely a construct, an agreed upon 'idea.'  And ideas are contingent. 

What I'm driving at is that God as Christians understand him is the one that authored the entire natural order.  We state that he dictated what those laws are and he is not beholden to them.  A metaphysical naturalism that argues that there is not likely a God because empirical observations prove he doesn't exist is in our mind a flat out contradiction in terms.

For this reason, metaphysical naturalism as you've been explaining it is not a suitable alternative to Christian theism, being a question of apples and oranges.

"Hello is always a nice introduction.  Make an appearance, communicate, etc."

But through the medium of our senses, right?  What other ways besides that medium do you propose?